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You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but 
y ou cannot fool all of the people all of the time. 
Abraham Lincoln 
Clinton, Illinois, September 2, 1858 
We have undertaken to teach the voters, as free, independent citizens, intelligent enough to 
see their rights, interested enough to insist on being treated justly, and patriotic enough to 
desire their country's welfare. Thus this campaign is one of information and organization. 
Every citizen should be regarded as a thoughtful , responsible voter, and he should be fur­
nished the means of examining the issues involved in the pending canvass for himself. 
Grover Cleveland 
Letter to Chauncey E. Black , September 14, 1888 
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1 Introduction 
Polit ical scientists have long been pessimistic about the effects of presidential campaigns 
on voter decision making. The pioneering work of the "Columbia School" in the compan­
ion volumes The People 's Choice by Lazarsfeld ,  Berelson and Gaudet (1944) and Voting by
Berelson , Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) set the agenda both methodologically and substan­
tively for what is now called the "minimal effects" hypothesis . They were concerned with 
measuring the effect of the campaign on the electorate,  and to do this, they were the first 
to use the panel survey to study presidential elections .  The first study (discussed in in The
People 's Choice) was conducted in Erie County, Ohio, hetween May and November, 1940. 
Of an original sample of 3000, interviewed in May, they took four samples of 600 individu­
als .  One of these samples was re-interviewed each month until the election; the other three 
were each re-interviewed once. Concurrently, another group of researchers gathered monthly 
samplings of the events in the campaign , the candidate's statements ,  and the coverage in 
the media of the campaign . 1 The idea was to measure the changes in preferences which the 
Columbia researchers expected to occur during the electoral season and then match those 
changes in preferences with campaign events and information (Natchez 1985). 
*Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C.,
September 1993. John Aldrich, Robert Bates, John Brehm, David Canon, and Peter Lange all provided very 
helpful advice about this research. I thank Thomas Patterson for access to his content analysis of the 1976 
presidential election . Correspondence can be addressed to the author at California Institute of Technology,
228-77 DHSS, Pasadena CA 91 1 25 (phone 818-395-4273) (internet rma@hss.caltech.edu) .
1The 1948 study which culminated in the publication of Voting was of a similarily innovative design. The
study focused on one community, Elmira, New York, and the panel consisted of interviews of respondents in 
June, August, October, and November. Also data on the campaign was collected as well. 
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But instead of documenting dramatic changes, the Columbia team found an amazing 
stability of preferences in the 1 940 election: "What the polit ical campaign did, so to speak ,  
was not to form new opinions but to raise old opinions over the thresholds of  awareness and 
decision. Political campaigns are important primarily because they activate latent predispo­
sitions" (Lazarsfeld ,  Berelson and Gaudet 1944: 74) . In terms of voting decisions, they found 
that the presidential campaign changed few minds, and for most voters , the campaign only 
reinforced their predispositions to vote for one candidate or the other. Thus they reached 
what should have been a startling conclusion: "In sum, then, this is what the campaign 
does : reinforcement (potential )  53%; activation 14%; reconversion 3%;  partial conversion 
6%; conversion 8%; no effect 1 6%" (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1 944: 103) .  This is a 
remarkable finding, since only 14% of their sample changed the ir voting decision during the 
course of a presidential election campaign .  Thus began the "minimal effects" hypothesis -
that campaigns and the mass media only influence mass preferences at the margin ( Iyengar 
and Kinder 1 987). 
The second important substantive finding to come out of the Erie County study involved 
the informational content of the campaign . From a dataset covering a number of major radio 
addresses by the candidates, radio newscasts, magazine editorials and articles , and front-page 
newspaper coverage, the Columbia team also set out to discover what information had been
passed to the electorate during this campaign . 2 They found that an overwhelming proportion
of campaign information concerned the campaign itself, campaign tactics , and the relative 
standings of the candidates in the race (over one third ) ;  with lesser coverage of Roosevelt 's 
record (one quarter) ;  and the remainder devoted to discussions of the candidate's personal 
characteristics and policy proposals .  
These conclusions were buttressed by their analysis of the major radio addresses of the 
candidates in 1 948. Again,  they asserted that campaign information was not policy-oriented 
- Truman's speeches covered general aspects of the campaign (35%) ,  while Dewey concen­
trated on the symbolic issue of the 1 948 race, the "unity of the American people" (26% ) .  
Additionally, i n  the 1948 data they found that "The opposing candidates tended to 'talk past 
each other , '  almost as though they were participating in two different elections" (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1 954 : 236 ) .  Therefore, the major conclusions that came out of their 
early analysis of the informational content of the campaign was that little "substance" was 
discussed during the campaign and that the candidates did little to force direct confrontation 
on issues in their campaign rhetoric. Yet the Columbia team did not relate directly either 
of these two findings to their conclusion that campaigns do not induce voters to alter their 
preferences . 3  
2It i s  not clear from the discussion in  The People's Choice �xactly what the criteria for inclusion of a
news source, and consequently a particular campaign story, into this analysis was. Nor is the coding or 
classification scheme given. They are also vague about their campaign data in Voting. 
3This is odd, since in the 1948 election they relate the shift toward Truman late in the campaign to the 
fact that the standards by which many voters evaluated Truman changed from his personal characteristics 
to his stands on labor and class issues (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954: 269). What makes it so odd 
is that their own data in the previous chapter shows that Truman stressed labor issues relatively heavily in 
his speeches (p. 236). 
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The last important finding in this work was articulated most clearly in Voting. Here they 
found that voters selectively obtained information. First , some voters were systematically 
more exposed to political information , especially the mass media, than others . Second, voters 
were more likely to pay attention to information which was favorable to their preferred 
candidate. And lastly, they showed that voters tended to see their preferred candidate's 
stands on issues as similar to their own, and the opponent's as much different than theirs. 
But even though selective exposure seemed pervasive ,  a number of interesting campaign 
effects can be observed in their data. Truman's policy positions , which were clearer and 
more confrontational than Dewey's, were much less subject to projection and misperception. 
Also, as the campaign progressed, perceptual accuracy about the issue positions of the 
candidates among voters increased. And last , those who were more exposed to campaign 
information were more accurate in their perceptions of the candidate's stands as well . Thus, 
even though the campaign may not have changed the preferences of most voters , it influenced 
the information obtained by the voters and their propensity to misperceive the positions of 
the candidates on policy issues . 
The importance of the Columbia research cannot be underemphasized . First , this re­
search was methodologically innovative, especially regarding the development of the panel 
study. Second,  it established the subsequent research agenda with their conclusion that po­
litical campaigns had only marginal conversion (or persuasion) effects .  Third , and typically 
understated in this literature, they found substantial evidence that political campaigns lead 
to significant changes in how voters perceive or misperceive candidates . 
Interestingly, it has been the second finding of the Columbia research which has received 
the greatest publicity in the polit ical science literature.  Writing specifically about the effects 
of the news media on the political perceptions of citizens , Patterson and McClure argued that 
"most network newscasts are neither very educational nor very powerful communications" 
( 1 976 :  90) .  Their detailed analysis went even further than the Columbia results, and led 
Patterson and McClure to conclude that television news had almost no political ramifications 
at all . And in a follow-up study, patterned closely on the Columbia analyses (panel surveys 
during the 1976 campaign combined with extensive content analysis of the campaign coverage 
in the media) , Patterson reached virtually the same conclusion : 
Election news carries scenes of action,  not observations on the values represented 
by these scenes. Election news emphasizes what is different about events of the 
previous 24 hours rather than everyday political topics . Election news concentrates 
on competition and controversy instead of basic policy and leadership questions . 
. . the news is not an adequate guide to po1itical choice. The candidates' agendas 
are not readily evident in press coverage of the campaign ( 1980 :  1 74 ) .  
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In most of the major studies which have followed up on the conclusions of the Columbia 
school , finding evidence that campaigns and mass media sources have little persuasion effects 
has not been very difficult .4 
This is not to say that campaigns and the mass media have no political effects .  Rather, 
it might simply be that looking for campaign or media persuasion is incorrect ; instead of 
looking for changing voter preferences, campaigns and the mass media might have a broader 
(and more important) impact . Perhaps the Columbia school was correct - the information 
the campaign provides shapes mainly voter perceptions, and not their preferences . Interest­
ingly, there are some recent studies , from quite diverse methodological perspectives , which 
demonstrate this very point . 
One puzzling aspect of the "minimal effects" literature is that it is  difficult to imagine that 
the mass media could have no political effects ,  given the exceptional amount of information 
which is present in the media in an election year. Graber ( 1 988) conducted an intensive study 
of twenty-one voters during the 1976 election season, combined with a content analysis of 
the media outlets they were exposed to in Evansville, Illinois .  In her breakdown of only 
polit ically-relevant media coverage in the 1976 election, Graber found a total of 30 ,662 news 
topics covered in the local newspapers , and 38 ,510  news topics covered by the local and 
national television newscasts .  The question in the face of these figures is how individuals 
cope with such a tsunami of political information. 
Graber, working within a cognitive information processing framework, finds that the in­
dividuals in her analysis have very efficient methods of dealing with the flood of information. 
In the first stage, people simply ignore old and redundant information. Then, Graber argues , 
the stories they deem interesting or novel are processed schematically, allowing the individual 
to integrete the information into their existing knowledge structures . And since news is often 
repetitive, substantial learning does occur. Therefore, even with the seemingly haphazard 
approach taken by the individuals in her study, there is such a massive amount of infor­
mat ion available during a presidential election , that "Americans are capable of extracting 
enough meaningful political information from the :flood of news to which they are exposed to 
perform the modest number of citizenship functions that American society expects of them" 
(Graber 1 988: 252 ) .  
Additionally, Iyengar and Kinder (1 987), combining survey data with a large number of 
experimental studies , offer convincing evidence against the "minimal effects" hypotheses . 
First , their analysis of the 1980 election shows that the media was capable during that 
election of inducing substantial changes in individual preferences . However , a number of 
special circumstances need to be present for substantial..persuasion to occur during a political 
campaign - many voters must remain uncommitted until the last days of the race, late 
political events must be covered extensively by the media and be polit ically relevant , and 
these political events must favor one candidate. 
4See Finkel ( 1993) for both an example of such research and an excellent review. 
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Instead of persuasion , though, Iyengar and Kinder find substantial support for the notion 
that the television media has a great deal of political influence. And here their work ties 
directly into the findings by the Columbia school , in that the major effects of the campaign 
and television news "appears to rest not on persuasion but on commanding the public's 
attention (agenda-setting) and defining criteria underlying the public 's  judgments (priming)"
( Iyengar and Kinder 1 987: 1 1 6 ) .
Yet more recently, there have been many important works supporting the not ion that 
polit ical campaigns and the mass media have a significant influence on the mass electorate 
- both on their preferences and the criteria underlying those preferences . In the 1 976 
presidential election , Conover and Feldman ( 1 989)-observed that misperceptions of the can­
didate's stands virtually disappeared as the general election campaign progressed. Working 
with data on presidential primaries , Bartels ( 1988) and Popkin ( 1 991)  have both shown that 
campaign events and changes in available information about candidates lead to substantial 
changes in the criteria voters use to judge candidates , and hence, to changes in their relative 
evaluations of primary candidates. With senate elections data, Franklin ( 199 1 )  has shown 
that the information made available by the candidates competing for office influences voter 
perceptions . Zaller , working across these national elections , summarized his results (and 
the literature) : "Campaigns bring about attitude change, as I have sought to show, not 
by producing a sudden conversion experience, but by producing incremental changes in the 
balance of considerations that underlie people's summary attitudes" ( 1989 :  231 ) .
Two immediate conclusions should be taken from this literature. Clearly, campaigns and 
the mass media "matter ."  That is the most important point raised by the flurry of recent 
research on this topic . In fact , it strains the imagination to think that campaigns and the 
mass media do not have important electoral ramifications . So many important events happen 
in a campaign , and there is such a flood of campaign and political media coverage during 
the electoral season, that both must have some effect . If not , then why would candidates 
bother to campaign , and why would the media bother to· cover the race? 
More importantly, this literature argues that the effects of campaigns and the mass media 
should not be expressed directly in changes in electoral preferences - in Iyengar and Kinder's 
terms , in persuasion . Clearly it is difficult to change the minds of voters , and neither 
political campaigns nor the mass media are well suited for that task. However, perceptions 
are less malleable ,  and are more subject to change. Perhaps even more subject to change 
are misperceptions, or the degree to which the perceptions of voters are inaccurate. Most 
of these works, from the Columbia research to the most recent work summarized above, 
argue that political campaigns and the mass media can and do influence voter perception 
and misperception , and .therefore,.indirectly.influence . .pr.efer..ences_.as ... welL .So to study the 
impact of the political campaign and the media on the electorate ,  a better focus might be 
on the perceptions and misperceptions of voters . 5 
In the remainder of this paper, I offer a theoretical model which provides this focus.  My 
approach is  rooted in a simple Bayesian model of learning, which produces a flexible and 
5 A similar argument is advanced in Alvarez and Franklin ( 1993). 
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useful model of voter learning during a campaign. Then I test some simple implications of the 
model using data from the 1 976 presidential election, These tests show first that there were 
substantial changes during the 1 976 campaign in the information made available about the 
candidates : as the election neared, more "substantive" information was presented to voters . 
Second,  I show that with more information about the policy positions of the candidates , 
voters perceived those positions with greater certainty. Addit ionally, this learning took 
place mainly among those voters with the most to learn - those with the least information , 
education; and media exposure. I conclude with a discussion of the utility of this approach
for understanding voter decision making in presidential elections. 
2 A Bayesian Model of Campaign Learning 
2.1 The Basics of the Bayesian Model 
To examine the dynamic relationship between campaign information and voter perception 
and preference, I employ a simple Bayesian model of political information . The Bayesian 
learning model , like the spatial model of voting, is not a completely descriptive model of 
behavior. Instead,  it provides an explicit ,  consistent , and systematic accounting of the 
way in which individuals might combine newly encountered information with their past 
understandings of the political world.6 While Bayesian models are rare in the political 
science literature, their empirical applications have been successful (Achen 1 992; Bartels
1 993; Calvert and MacKuen 1 985; Franklin 1 992; Husted , Keyyy and Morton 1 993; Zechman 
1978 ) .  
The intuition behind the Bayesian model i s  compelling. Basically, the model states that 
the voter has prior perceptions or information (called "priors" ) , and that these prior beliefs
are updated with the acquisition of new information, yielding revised , "posterior" beliefs .  
The Bayesian approach provides a particular mathematical framework for the formation of 
new perceptions . To express the Bayesian model formally, first define fht to be candidate k's
position on a particular issue at t ime t ,  /kt to be the voter's knowledge of the candidate's 
position, and 'T/kt to represent information received about the candidate k 's  position.
Next , instead assuming that voters should be perfectly informed during a presidential 
election season , I assume that they are imperfectly informed about candidates and their policy 
6 M any believe the Bayesian model to be of little utility in the analysis of perceptual formation and change. 
But the Bayesian model actually complements the psychological learning models which have become popular 
in the political science..-l.iterature;=Where--the-fflgnitive--psyelrologicai·models-"have--presented very complete 
descriptions of the structures of past political information , whether they are termed scripts, schemas , stereo­
types , or whatever else , these models have been less descriptive as to the processes by which new information
is incorporated into these cognitive structures (some attempts have been made in this l iterature to overcome
this tendency ;  see Conover and Feldman 1989; Lodge and Hamill 1986; Lodge, McGraw and Stroh 1989). 
While the Bayesian model is less descriptive in the structuring of past information, it  is more rigorous in 
the description of how newly-encountered information can be combined with old knowledge for updated 
assessments of the political world. See Achen ( 1992) for additional discussion . 
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stands. It has long been an established truism that voters are poorly informed (e.g. , Campbell 
et al . 1960), with the debate centering over the causes of their imperfect information (Key
1966). Some of the imperfections in the information flow stem from the candidates and the
information transmission process ,  others from the abilities and incentives of voters (Page 
1978: 281). 
Here, I assume that the beliefs (or perceptions of the candidate on issues , in this case) are 
known imperfectly by the voter , and hence, are described as a set of probability distributions . 
The voter's prior probability distribution, the voter's calculation of the probability that the 
candidate will have a certain position once in office, conditioned on their knowledge of that 
position, is defined by: 
( 1 )  
This states that the voter's  calculation of the candidate's  position developed from past knowl­
edge of that position is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean µi and a variance
u;. Similarily, the probability that the voter would actually observe the newly encountered 
information , T/kt, conditioned on the candidate's position and the voter 's knowledge of that 
position, were the candidate in office is defined as : 
(2) 
And last , the voter 's  posterior distribution also has a similar definition, where the proba­
bility that the candidate is  actually at the particular position is conditioned on the voter 's 
knowledge of the position and the newly-encountered information about the candidate: 7 
(3) 
Now that these probability distributions have been defined, Bayes ' Theorem states that 
the posterior distribution is proportional to the product of the prior distribution and the 
distribution of the newly -encountered information. That is ,  
This can be expressed in terms of the moments of these distributions as :8 
T1µ1 + T2µ2µ3 = T1 + T2 
T3 = T1 + T2 
(4) 
(5) 
Note that r; = (uj)"""'1 forj=1,2,3.�While the r; are termed "precisions" in the li terature,
they really are just the inverses of the voter's uncertainty regarding each bit of information 
7 Here I have assumed the normal distribution for simplicity. Other distributions can be used in this 
model (DeGroot 1970). Also, I have assumed that the information the voter receives is costless . Future 
development of this learning model , incorporating costly information , is clearly necessary. 
8 Derivations of this step are in Zechman 1978, Appendix A, as well as in Judge et al . 1988, Chapter 4, 
and in most references on decision theory (Berger 1985; DeGroot 1970; J ones 1977). 
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- their previous understanding of the candidate's position ,  the new information received , 
and their new understanding of the candidate's position. 
So what is the interpretation of this Bayesian learning model? Where the voter perceives 
the candidate to stand on the issue, in light of some new information , is the weighted average 
of their past knowledge of the candidate's  position and their newly-obtained information. 
The weights, further, are simply the precisions of each piece of information , which have been 
defined as being proportional to the variances of the relevant probability distributions. The 
voter finds out something new about the candidate's  position - from speeches, conventions , 
advertising, advertisement , the media, or whatever source - and alters their perception 
of this position in the direction of the new information. Butrand· of importance for this 
discussion, the amount by which voters alter their perceptions depends on the precision of 
the new information, relative to their past perceptions. 
In order to highlight the intuition behind the Bayesian model as presented in Equation 5 ,  
the effects of newly-obtained information upon both the mean and precision of the voter 's 
posterior distribution regarding the position of the candidate on an issue are shown graph­
ically. I performed two sets of simulations by setting all of the terms in Equation 5 to the 
following simulated values . The voter's prior knowledge of the candidate's position (µ1 )
is 0 . 5 .  The voter then receives new information that the candidate's expected position is 
1 . 5 .  To assess the effects of the precision of these both the prior and new information on 
the voter 's posterior knowledge , I then varied the precision of the new information about 
the candidate's position (r2), which takes a range of hypothetical values from zero (extreme
imprecision ) to 20 (extreme precision) , and the precision of the voter 's  prior knowledge of
the candidate's position (ri), which I varied across three values , low, moderate, and high .
These simulations are given in Figure 1 ,  where the top panel gives the mean of the voter 's 
posterior knowledge and the bottom panel gives the posterior precision . In each panel , the 
lines represent one of the assumed levels of prior precision while the x-axis gives the precision 
of the new information . 
What is  interesting to notice in the top panel of Figure 1 is the effect which the two 
precisions have on the voter 's adjustment of their perception. When the precision of their 
prior knowledge is low, even relatively imprecise new information can induce a dramatic 
change in the posterior mean in favor of the new information.  However, as the precision of 
the prior knowledge increases , the voter places more weight on their prior knowledge than on 
the new information,  so the new information must be extremely precise to induce a change 
in the perception of where the candidate stands on the particular issue. 
In the bottom panel of Figure 1 the y-axis represents the _precision of the posterior dis­
tribution . Recall that the posterior precision is simply the sum of the precision of the prior 
knowledge and the new information , which accounts for the linear relationships seen
Figure. Not surprisingly, a positive relationship is observed in the Figure for each level of 
prior precision , indicating that as the precision of the new information increases , so does 
the precision of the posterior . Also worth notice here is that new information in the model 
always increases posterior precision . Thus, the model predicts that if the voter has a very 
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precise prior understanding of where the candidate stands on the issue, and encounters very 
precise information which leads them to update their prior perceptions , the precision of their 
posterior knowiedge will be greater, though not by a very large amount .9 
So far, I demonstrated two aspects of the Bayesian model : the effects which newly­
obtained information has on each element of the voter's knowledge of the candidate's policy 
stands - the mean and precision (or variance) of that distribution. The next step is to 
show how changes in voter perception of candidate issue positions are incorporated into 
their evaluations of the candidates. For this purpose, I use the spatial model of voting. 10 
In this vers�oil of the spatial model , I assume there are two candidates and that the prefer­
ences and utility functions of voters are such that the axioms of expected utility maximation 
apply. Also, I assume that there is one policy dimension relevant to the voter, and that the 
voter takes only information about their position and the candidate's posit ion on this issue 
into account . The voter 's expected utility from a particular candidate J is the utility the 
voter would anticipate, conditioned on their posterior distribution , is  (Zechman 1978): 
(6) 
This leads to a decision making rule for the voter, that is ,  vote for candidate J instead of G 
iff: 
( 7) 
Assume, as above, that the voter's posterior is distributed normally, with a mean and a 
variance (proportional to the precision) ,  and as in the earlier sections of this chapter, that 
the distance between the voter and the candidate can be written in terms of quadratic loss .  
This implies that the voter wil l  prefer candidate J iff (µ3J - w3)2 2::: (µ3a - w3)2, that i s ,  if
the posterior mean of candidate J is closer to their position ( where the voter's position is 
denoted by w) than the posterior mean of candidate G. By substituting from Equation 5 for
each candidate , this gives an amended decision rule, vote for candidate J iff: 
(8 )  
As complex as th is  might seem, interesting insights into the dynamics of voter prefer­
ences are obtained by analysis of the relationships between information, perceptions , and 
preferences in Equation 8. A very easy way to gain intuition into these relationships is again 
through simulations. The model in Equations 7 and 8 can be written probabilistically, and 
in that formulation , the relationship between the various elements of Equation 8 and the 
probability that a typical voter might support one of the candidates can be easily shown. 
9Since the variances of these distributions are assumed to be positive ,  so are the precisions. Under such 
condit ions , the precision of the posterior will never be less than the precision of the prior .  
1 0 The incorporation of the updated knowledge of the candidate's position into the spatial model is relatively 
simple to demonstrate.  More exhaustive discussions are in Calvert ( 1980) and Zechman ( 1978). Discussion 
of the standard spatial model of the sort I employ here is found in Enelow and Hinich ( 1984). 
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First , to cast this model into a probabilistic format , I assume that the expected utility for 
candidate G is  zero. Second, I assume that the non-issue components (denoted here by CiJ 
of the voter's  evaluation of candidate J are distributed normally, and are independent of the 
voter' s  i ssue-based evaluation of the candidate . 1 1  These assumptions allow me to examine 
the Bayesian model probabilistically. First , rearrange the terms: 
(9)  
( 1 0) 
where 1-J = (711eii+7ueu - w2) • Then under the assumption that CiJ i s  distributed nor-' T1J+T2J 3 l mally and independently of liJ, this expression can be written probabilistically: 
11 1 -c2 P[liJ + CiJ �OJ= ro= exp-2 du
00 y27r 
( 1 1 )  
This presentation allows me t o  insert hypothetical values into this probabilistic model and 
to depict graphically the relationship between the uncertainty the voter has about the can­
didate's policy positions and the probability that the voter would support the candidate. 
Four such simulations were carried out , with two in the top panel of Figure 2 and two in the 
bottom panel . 
The x-axis in each panel of Figure 2 gives the precision of the newly-encountered infor­
mation, and the y-axis gives the change in probabilit ies of supporting the candidate once the 
new information has been assimilated by the voter . The new information the voter receives is  
that the candidate is closer to the voter on the issue than reflected in their prior knowledge; 
Two lines are plotted in each panel , one for a situation where the new information indicates 
that the candidate is much closer to the voter 's position .on the policy issue than the voter 
previously believed (dotted line) , and one where the information states that the candidate 
is  not much closer to the voter on the issue (dark line) . The top panel presents these plots 
for a situation in which the voter's prior knowledge was imprecise, while the bottom panel 
gives the plots for a scenario in which the voter 's prior knowledge was precise. 
Comparision of the results of these simulations produces some interesting conclusions. 
First , in the top panel of Figure 2 it is apparent that when the voter has an imprecise prior 
knowledge of the candidate's position, and receives new information that the candidate is 
closer to their ideal point ,  that relatively large changes in the voter 's  probability of supporting 
the candidate occur across a wide range of precisions of the new information . Compare two 
scenarios . First , the new information is very imprecise, with a precision near zero, and 
second ,  where the information is relatively precise , at a simulated value of approximately 
nine. In the first scenario,  the probability that the voter supports the candidate does not 
change very much , no matter how close the candidate has moved to the voter 's position, 
11 Note that these assumptions are only required to demonstrate this theoretical model probabilistically,
and are not relevant in subsequent empiri cal eval uation of the model . 
1 0  
- ,  ____ _ ,  --- - ----
since their perception of the candidate's position is  simply not very precise . However, in the 
second scenario ,  notice the wide divergence between the changes in probability of supporting 
the candidate where the candidate has moved much closer to the voter, relative to only 
slightly closer. As we might anticipate, when the prior information is imprecise, but the new 
information is  precise, the voter adjusts their evaluation of the candidate weighing heavily 
the new information, evidenced by the large change in the probability of supporting the 
candidate, and these changes are greater when the information indicates that the candidate 
is closer to the voter on the issue. 
But in the bottom panel of Figure 2, where the prior information is much more precise,
a different conclusion is apparent . Again, compare two scenarios , the first in which the 
voter 's new knowledge is very imprecise (near zero) , as compared to a situation in which the
information obtained is relatively precise (near nine) . Interestingly, in the first scenario, the
voter is  very unlikely to support the candidate - since their relatively precise prior states 
that they are not very near to the candidate on the issue, and very imprecise information 
does little to change this prior . Yet in the second scenario ,  there is a change in the likelihood 
that the voter would support the candidate (the difference in simulated probabilities is
approximately 0 .35 for the voter close to the candidate and around 0 . 05 for the voter further 
from the candidate) , indicating that precise information can lead to a change in preferences
when the new information is itself precise. 
What is most interesting here, however , is the comparison between the Figures. The 
conclusions when the new information obtained by the voter is very imprecise do not vary 
whether the candidate is near or far from the voter, or whether the priors are precise or 
imprecise. But when the new information is precise, we do see a good deal of variation 
depending on the relative location of the candidate and the precision of the prior knowledge. 
In the two simulations where the voter is closer to the candidate, they are more likely to 
support the candidate when they obtain new and precise information about the candidate's 
position. 
But when the prior information is less precise, and the information reveals that the can­
didate is much closer to the voter , the change in probabilities is drastically greater than 
when the prior information is more precise. New information - even relatively imprecise 
information - leads the voter to update their knowledge greatly and to even change their 
evaluation of the candidate, when prior information about the candidate's position is uncer­
tain .  However, when the voter's prior knowledge is more certain, new information - even 
relatively precise information - does not lead to a great deal of updated perceptions and 
does not result in relatively large changes in candidate evaluations. 
2.2 Insights from the Bayesian Model 
The Bayesian model discussed in the previous section revealed some very interesting im­
plications for the way in which new information about a candidate's policy posit ion might 
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influence a voter' s  perception or misperception of the candidate's position, and their evalua­
tion of the candidate. Two general hypotheses follow from the discussion in the last section. 
First , voters should update their perceptions of candidate issue stands when they obtain new 
information about those stands; thus the perceptions of voters should change when informa­
tion about these stands becomes increasingly available during the campaign. Second, new 
information will lead voters to change their evaluations of the candidate, especially when the 
prior information was very imprecise. 
Thus by incorporating imperfect information into an individual-level model of voter pref­
erences and perceptions , the Bayesian approach sheds insights into many of the past findings 
in the literature. I have shown that when presented with new information about the posi­
tions of the candidates on policy issues , voters should assimilate that information into their 
perceptions of the candidates ' stands. This "learning" should occur on two levels: voters 
are expected to update, or change, their estimate of the candidate's posit ion (the mean ) , as
well as their uncertainty of the candidate's position (the precision ) . Therefore, when infor­
mation is available , perceptual learning should occur in the electorate. Demonstrating this 
relationship ,  then , will show that campaigns do "matter ."  
Yet the Bayesian learning model also implies that the effects of campaign learning should 
be most apparent in the perceptions or misperceptions of voters . Usually, in general elections 
at the presidential level , voters will have some, if not a great deal of prior knowledge of both 
candidates . In such a situation , the insights of the Bayesian model are that we expect to 
see new information have little effect on the expected value of the voter' s  perceptions, but 
perhaps a larger effect on the certainty of their perception; additionally we would rarely 
expect a substantial change in their preferences . In this perspective, the "minimal effects" 
findings are really not so surprising - in presidential election , with incumbents fighting 
against well-known challengers , or even with nationally-prominent challengers contesting for 
an "open" seat , voters should have relatively precise priors even at the beginning of the 
general election season . 
But different electoral contexts might produce different conclusions . For example, early 
in a presidential primary, when voter knowledge of the positions of the candidates is very 
uncertain ,  new information , even if it is also uncertain,  can produce large changes in the 
voter 's perceptions of the candidate's posit ion , their uncertainty of that position,  and even 
in their preferences. This provides a theoretical account for the volatility witnessed early in 
the primary season in voter preferences and perceptions . They have imprecise knowledge , 
and learning new information in an uncertain situation can have dramatic consequences . 
So generally, we would expect.information.io..hav.e.differ.enLeffects .. across the course of a
presidential campaign . Early in the primary season , when knowledge is imprecise, a little 
new information can go a long way - even as far as changing a voter 's preferences . But late 
in the general election , in the weeks before the general election , voters will typically have 
precise priors about the positions of the candidates. So even a lot of new information , even 
precise new information ,  will not induce a change in voter preferences . Late in the campaign, 
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though, the major source of change should instead be in the precision of their beliefs ; that 
i s ,  in their certainty about the candidates . 
3 Simple Tests of the Bayesian Learning Model: The 
1976 Presidential Election 
So do campaigns provide information to voters about the positions of the candidates? And 
do voters learn about these positions during the campaign? To answer these questions, I 
focus on the 1976 election. 12 Using data from Thomas Patterson's panel study and media 
content analysis from this election ,  I test the hypotheses derived from the Bayesian learning 
model . This section begins by discussing the information provided to the electorate in 
1 976 , as reflected by mass media coverage of the candidates . It is  clear from this discussion 
that , unlike the claims of many, the media during this election provided a great deal of 
coverage of the positions of both Ford and Carter , and that the dynamics of this coverage 
correspond to campaign events .  Then I turn to the individual-level survey data and show 
that there are substantial reductions in voter uncertainty of the positions of the candidates 
during the campaign , which are directly related to the flow of information. These reductions 
in uncertainty, moreover, occurred for the least educated, informed, and politically-exposed 
respondents .  I close with a discussion of these important results .  
The measure of uncertainty I employ in this section is taken from Alvarez ( 1 992) .  There 
have been two types of survey-based measures of uncertainty in the literature.  First , there are 
the direct survey question approaches to measuring uncertainty (Aldrich et al . 1 982 ;  Alvarez 
1 992 ; Alvarez and Franklin 1 993 ) .  In these attempts to probe voter uncertainty, survey 
questions are explicitly designed to probe uncertainty; some of these attempts have been 
quite successful (Alvarez and Franklin 1993 ) .  Second ,  there are indirect approaches. These 
rely upon the use of surrogate measures , which either se
,
rve as instruments for uncertainty 
(Bartels 1 986; Franklin 1991 ) ,  or as attempts to operationalize uncertainty from survey 
questions . My measurement strategy takes the latter approach . 
In the Bayesian model , the voter's  prior, newly-obtained, and posterior information were 
assumed to be distributed with a mean and a variance. My approach relies upon opera­
tionalizing this variance in voter understandings of the policy positions of candidates , by 
measurmg: 
( 12) 
where ViJ represents voter i ' s uncertainty in their placement of J ,  PiJk gives i's placement of
J on each of the relevant k policy dimensions, and TJk indicates the position of candidate J
on policy dimension k .  
121 am currently undertaking an identical analysis of the 1980 election . 
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This is a representation of the voter's uncertainty about the candidate's position across 
the policy space, in terms of the net dispersion of the voter's perception of the candidate's 
posit ion and the candidate's true position .  The greater the dispersion of their perceptions 
of the candidate's position from the candidate's true position (here measured by the mean
placement of the candidate on each issue across the particular sample) , the more uncertain
they are about the candidate's position on the policy issues ; the tighter this dispersion of 
point s ,  the less uncertain they are about the candidate's position. 
This representat ion of voter uncertainty is appealing for three reasons .  First , unlike 
the measures of uncertainty often employed in the literature, this representation directly 
operat ionalizes uncertainty from the survey data, and does not infer indirectly a uncertainty 
measure from ancillary information about respondents .  Second, this measure meshes closely 
with the "precisions" as discussed in relation to the Bayesian model , which will allow for 
rigorous tests of the implications of that model . Third, this measure can be applied to 
exist ing survey data, particularily the historical data from the Nat ional Election Studies , 
where there are questions asking respondents to place candidates on policy scales . 
But , before moving directly to the 1 976 election, it is important to discuss what this 
particular measure does not do. One,  unless repeated measures about the same policy 
issues were posed to the respondent , this measure cannot gauge uncertainty about specific 
issues. Instead it is intended to measure more generally the uncertainty the voter has about 
candidates across issues . Also, the accuracy of this measure will depend upon the accuracy 
of the questions used to measure both the voter's and the candidate's positions on the issue. 
However, without direct survey questions probing respondent uncertainty, this approach is 
quite attractive . 13 
3.1 Information Dynamics in the 1976 Campaign 
For learning about the positions of the candidates to be possible , a baseline level of infor­
mation is necessary. That even minimal levels of information about the posit ions of the 
candidates in 1 976 was made available by the mass media is in dispute. Thomas Patter­
son , analyzing the same data I use in this section , concluded that "the press concentrates 
on the strategic game played by the candidates in their pursuit of the presidency, thereby 
de-emphasizing questions of national policy and leadership" (Patterson 1 980 :  2 1  ) . As shown
in Patterson 's analysis ,  the media does appear to focus on the strategic aspects of the pres­
idential contest relative to more substantive matters . 
So in order-to-discuss-the-effect-of-the -campaign un voter perceptions of·candidate issue 
posit ions , I present evidence on the information dynamics of the 1976 presidential campaign . 
A precondition for voter learning to occur is  that the electorate must be presented with infor­
mation during the campaign. But to show that learning occurred regarding the uncertainty 
13M ore discussion of this measure of uncertainty, and the others in the literature ,  can be found in  Alvarez 
( 1992 )  and Alvarez and Franklin (1993). 
14 
of the electorate about the positions of Ford and Carter in 1 976 , I need to demonstrate that 
information about their positions was in fact transmitted during this election , and that voter 
perceptions responded to this information. The Bayesian model developed above posited that 
when presented with new information , voter uncertainty should diminish. The central task 
here is to demonstrate that increasing amounts of substantive ,  i ssue-related information was 
presented to the electorate during the 1 976 campaign, and that aggregate voter uncertainty 
fell accordingly. 
Now I show first that coverage of the two major candidates was quite substantial -
more information about the major candidates was made available to the electorate as the 
campaign progressed. But even more important , the relative proportions of substantive 
information ( including information about the positions of the candidates) to strategic infor­
mation changed quite dramatically across the campaign .  During the general election period, 
moreover, substantive information actually exceeded strategic information.  And last , the 
dynamics of information during the general election period are related to campaign events .  
To simplify discussion of  the 1 976 campaign ,  I present in Table 1 a breakdown of  the 
major events during the ten-month period from January to October 1 976 . This table gives 
the beginning and ending events of the primary season, which stretched from January until 
the end of June. The party conventions were held in mid-July (Democrats)  and in mid­
August (Republicans) .  After the conventions, the general election campaign got underway, 
and was structured around three debates . The first debate (September 23 ) was focused on
domestic and economic issues, and Ford was eventually declared the "winner." With Ford 's 
support increasing after the debate, Carter began to attack Ford more directly (Kessel 1 984: 
1 57) . The second debate (October 6 )  was held in San Francisco and covered foreign policy. It 
was during this debate that Ford, responding to a question about relations with the Soviets ,  
remarked, "There is  no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under 
a Ford Administration" (New York Times, October 7, 1 976 , 1 :6) . Ford eventually recanted, 
and in the aftermath , was forced to campaign personally and through paid adverti sing very 
heavily, while the Carter campaign engaged in an increasingly negative campaign against 
Ford .  The race continued to tighten , and perhaps in response, during the third debate both 
candidates were very cautious . Then , with just over a week remaining, both candidates 
began the final phase of their campaigns with a flurry of advertisements and appearances . 
And on November 2 Carter barely won by sweeping the South and taking enough Northern 
states to give him a slim electoral college victory. 
So, did the media coverage of the campaign correspond to these campaign events? To 
examine the information dynamics of the campaign I used Patterson's media content data. 
Patterson randomly"5elected'"°ver-6,f;00-politicaHy�related-news-stories -concerning the 1 976 
election from nine mass media outlets ,  including newspapers , magazines , and television net­
works .  These stories were analyzed in great detail ,  and from the content codes I extracted 
8 ,834 "candidate mentions ," in which Patterson coded a reference for a specific candidate 
relating to a specific topic . 14 
14Patterson's media content analysis actually is contained in two datasets.  The first is the content analysis 
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Using these data, I first aggregated the reference topics during each month of the campaign 
following Patterson's guidelines : stories relating to evaluations of the candidate, strategies , 
tactics , logistics , support , campaign style, horse-race, appearances , and chances for victory 
were grouped under the label "hoopla" , while stories about the issue stands, ideologies , 
records ,  traits, and endorsements ,  of the candidate were categorized as "substance . " 1 5 The 
results of this analysis are presented in Figure 3 .  
Here the percentage of stories falling into either category is given on the y-axis ,  and the 
x-axis presents the month of the campaign. The dark line gives the percentage of substantive 
stories , while the light line gives the percentage of stories focused on the campaign.16 Notice 
that there is a great deal of temporal fluctuation in the proportions of coverage relating to 
each topic. Not surprisingly, the primary election period, from January to June, is over­
whelmingly devoted to the campaign and hoopla. That is ,  during the 1976 primary election
season, the information transmitted to the electorate about the campaign by the mass media 
concerned primarily stories about the candidate's positions in the horse-race, their strategies 
and tactics ,  and other non-substantive information . 
However, notice that during the general election period , this trend changes dramatically. 
In July and August , during both party 's conventions, coverage of substance rises greatly. 
Thus , in 1 976 it is apparent that during the late stages of the nomination process ,  and 
in the early stages of the general election, that the information dynamic of the campaign 
shifted heavily away from primarily hoopla to roughly balanced coverage of substance and 
the campaign. In September, coverage of substance actually was greater than that of the 
campaign, and in October the levels of hoopla versus substantive coverage were virtually 
identical . 
Therefore, Figure 3 provides evidence of an important informational dynamic in the 1 976 
campaign . The coverage relating specifically to the candidates was largely devoted to the 
campaign throughout the primary election . But this began a dramatic shift during the 
transition between primary and general elections (during the conventions ) , until there were
roughly even amounts of both types of candidate references in the general election . Thus, 
since the amount of substantive coverage concerning the candidates increased during the 
general election , one precondit ion for voter learning about the positions of the candidates 
exists . 
of all of  more than 6,500 stories . The second is a sub-set of  the first dataset , into which Patterson placed 
all candidate-specific media references . For each story, up to eight specific candidate "mentions" were coded 
and placed in the second dat aset . My data were drawn from this second set . Each observation in t h is dataset 
is a story, with source and date information . Each candidate mention is indexed by candidate, the subj ect of 
the reference , and a number of evaluation codes . Here I employ only the date , candidate, and subj ect codes . 
1 5 See Patterson 1980: 186, note 5 .  
1 6 In my analysis of the media coverage of the 1976-1988 campaigns as reflected in the New York Times 
Index that I found with a similar coding scheme that two-thirds of the general election media coverage focused
on the campaigns , and only one-third on substance (Alvarez 1992) . That result  paralleled the findings of 
both Patterson ( 1980) and Graber ( 1983) .  It is interesting to note that while these three studies all converge 
on these aggregate percentages of substance versus hoopla, I show in the next set of figures an amazing 
amount of volatility in these relative percentages over the 1976 campaign . 
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Yet , was the coverage of the two major party candidates also evenly balanced? Or did one 
candidate receive more coverage during the campaign? Or did candidate coverage fluctuate 
over the election year? To probe into these questions , I present in Figure 4 the percentages 
of references each month to Ford (dark line) and Carter ( light line) . Again,  the y-axis gives 
the percentage of stories for each candidate, while the x-axis gives the month of the election .  
Note, however, that the percentages are calculated here as the number of coded references 
to the particular candidate out of the total number of references to all candidates in that 
period . 1 7  
The trends in information during the election about the two major party nominees also 
parallel the events in the campaign quite well .  In Figure 4 note that in the early days of 
the primary season, Ford received a great deal of coverage while Carter received little: in 
January, Ford received over one-third of all references to candidates in the sampled news 
media, while Carter was mentioned in less than ten percent of the time. While Ford 's 
coverage remained relatively constant throughout the primary election period ,  the upward 
trend in Carter references is striking, and quite closely parallels his success in the Democratic 
primaries . 
Then, Carter 's  references peak during July - the month of the Democratic convention .  
Ford's mentions , after being at a constant 20% or so ,  climb to almost half of all candidate 
references in August - the month of the Republican convention. In September and October, 
the general election period , both Carter and Ford received similar levels of references . How­
ever, Carter had slightly less coverage in the last two months of the election year, which gives 
another indication of the difficulties of challenging even a non-elected incumbent president . 18 
Next , I examined the trends in hoopla and substantive references to both Ford and Carter . 
These are presented in Figures 5 and 6 .  Figure 5 gives the percent of hoopla references in 
each month for both candates on the y-axis ,  and the month of the campaign on the x-axis .  
Figure 6 is identical ,  except that the percentages of  substantive stories for the two candidates 
are graphed. In each figure, the dark line gives the percentages for Ford over the election 
year, and the light line for Carter. 
Starting with Figure 5, notice first that the trends in hoopla coverage for each candidate 
roughly parallel those for total candidate coverage just discussed . Carter received very few 
campaign-related references early in the primary season , but the percentage of mentions 
concerning Carter 's campaigning steadily climbed to peak at 35 .8% in July, the month of 
the Democratic convention. Campaign references for Carter dropped sharply during August , 
the month of the Republican convention, but jumped quickly back upward during the last 
two months of the..election . ..Ford receiv.ed.agreaLdeal .. oLho.opla.references .i.n the first month 
of the election, with almost 37% of the references in January. Again ,  this dropped to just 
over 20% , where his campaign-related references hovered until August . During the month of 
his party 's convention , the campaign-related mentions for Ford jumped to almost 50% of all 
1 7That is why the percentages , especially in the primary season,  do not sum to one hundred . 
18In September and October Carter received 45.9 and 44.9% of the references , respectively, while Ford 
picked up 48.4% in September and 51. 1% in November . 
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such references . During September and October, Ford 's hoopla references in the mass media 
were very similar to Carter's .  
But a different dynamic is clear in Figure 6. Here, Carter begins the election with almost
no substantive coverage (only 6% ) .  This is not surprising, given that he was competing for
substantive coverage with so many other, and so many better-known, primary candidates in 
both parties . But with early successes , Carter's substantive coverage climbed to almost 30% 
of all references in March through May. During June and July, though, the percentage of 
substantive mentions of Carter skyrocketed: 50 .8% in June (the last months of the Demo­
cratic primary) and 62.9% in July. The substantive references to Carter did drop during
August , and leveled off at just over 40% during the general election months of September 
and October. 
Ford, on the other hand, began with the lion's share of substantive coverage in January 
(30%) . He received approximately one-fifth of substantive coverage from February unti l  
July, during the entire primary and early convention season. But during August , and the 
Republican convention , substantive coverage of Ford jumped considerably, to 48%. And 
Ford received over half of the substantive mentions in September and October, at least 10% 
more than Carter obtained. 
Thus , I have established that quite dramatic changes occurred in the media coverage of 
the 1 976 election, especially as it pertained to references to Carter and Ford. And it is 
clear that the informational dynamics in Figures 3-6 concide closely with the major events 
of the campaign. This evidence alone shows that in 1 976 the preconditions for substantial 
voter learning about the positions of both Carter and Ford existed . That is ,  during the 
campaign , considerable information a.bout the candidates was available in the mass media, 
and the coverage of both major candidates , especially their substantive coverage, did increase 
dramatically in the post-primary period of the election year. 
Yet substantive coverage is not entirely made up of references to the issue positions of 
the two candidates . To more precisely understand the dynamics of issue coverage, I graphed 
only those references to Carter and Ford dealing with their positions on domestic or foreign 
policy issues . 19 These are given in Figure 7, where the y-axis now gives the percentage of 
issue-specific mentions for Ford (dark line ) and Carter ( light line) during each month of the
campaign . 
19Patterson coded as issue references those mentions which concerned the economy, unemployment , govern­
ment employment , inflation , tax reforms, abortion , working with Congress , crime , social welfare, government 
spending,  government efficiency, social security and medicare , minority rights ,  women 's rights , federalism , 
health care , the environment , consumer protection , gun control , education , drugs , energy, cities, busing,  as 
domestic issues ; military spending , foreign involvement , detente , foreign aid ,  the Middle Ease , O P EC ,  U . S .  
worl d  prestige, general foreign policy, Panama Canal , nuclear weapons , and other miscellaneous foreign and 
defense topics , as foreign issues . There were a total of 482 domestic issue references ( 152 for Carter , 2 19 for 
Ford ,  1 1 1  for other candidates) and 1003 foreign issue references (385 for Carter ,  350 for Ford ,  and 268 for 
the other candidates) . 
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The trends in Figure 7 are even more interesting than those shown for the broader category 
of substantive references . Here, Carter once again begins with exceptionally low levels of 
issue references ( less than 10% in January) , which is quite understandable given that he was
the unknown outsider candidate in the early Democratic primaries . Befitting his success in 
the early primaries , though, Carter does pick up a reasonable level of references to his issue 
stands from February to May. 
But in June, and then in July, mentions of Carter' s  positions on issues shot to 52% 
(June) and 76.2% (July) , as the campaign progressed from the late primary stage to the
Democratic convention. In particular ,  that Carter's issue positions received almost eight out 
of ten references to all candidates in July is amazing. However, the tremendous coverage of 
Carter's positions dropped to 40% in August , climbing to just over 50% by October. 
Ford received a constant 30% of the issue-specific coverage during most of the primary 
period, from January to May. As the attention shifted to Carter 's posit ions , when it became 
unavoidable that Carter would be the Democratic nominee , references to Ford 's positions 
fell to approximately 20% of all candidate issue mentions in June and July. Yet with the 
advent of the Republican convention in August , Ford 's positions received a great deal of 
coverage by the mass media. And again, the coverage devoted to Ford's i ssue stands during 
the general election was almost identical to that given to Carter. 
These figures demonstrate three points about the 1976 election . The first point is that 
there was a substantial amount of information available about the two major party candidates 
in this election . The entire sample from which these percentages were calculated had over 
8 ,000 candidate-specific references , and were drawn from a random sample of 6 ,500 political 
news stories. Thus, a great deal of information was available about the candidates in 1976 .  
Secondly, the flow of information during this campaign had clear and very understandable 
dynamics. Each of the five figures demonstrated that the information available about the 
two party candidates varied over the election year. Hoopla coverage dominated substantive 
coverage - but only in the primary campaign. Substantive coverage rose dramatically during 
the period of the party conventions, and actually was greater than campaign coverage during 
the two general election months (Figure 3 ) .  Total references to Carter were few in the early
primary months, but rose greatly in June and July of the election year; references to Ford 
were relatively constant through the entire campaign period, only rising after July (Figure
4 ) .  Hoopla and substantive coverage specifically devoted to Carter and Ford followed similar 
dynamics (Figures 5 and 6) .
And thirdly, both the broader substantive references and the narrow, issue-specific, ref­
erences to these two candidates show dramatic increases during the convention and general 
election periods (Figures 6 and 7) . Therefore, information about the positions of both Ford
and Carter, while relatively sparse before June of the election year, became relatively abun­
dent thereafter. This implies that the informational environment in 1976 could have been 
conducive to voter learning about the policy positions of both Ford and Carter, since clearly 
a great deal of information appears to have been transmitted via the mass media during 
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the later stages of this presidential campaign. Note last that the trends in information are 
especially strong for Carter , who as the outsider begin with a considerable deficit in  media 
coverage of his campaign . That substantive ,  and especially issue-specific, coverage of Carter 
skyrocketed in the early stages of the general election campaign, provided an excellent win­
dow for voters to learn about his policy positions, and perhaps explaining why he ended up 
as well known as the (unelected) incumbent . 
3 . 2  Voter Learning i n  1976 
Yet it remains to show that voters did learn from this information flow in 1 976. To demon­
strate that voter learning did occur, I return to the Bayesian learning model. It is possible 
to test the hypotheses were deduced from the theoretical analysis by exploit ing the panel 
data  which was also collected by Patterson in 1 976. The first hypothesis from the Bayesian 
model stated that with increasing information , voter uncertainty should change. I have 
shown in the previous section that increasing information about the candidates , and about 
their policy positions was made available as the campaign progressed . To substantiate this 
first hypothesis , I show that voter uncertainty of the positions of the candidates reduced 
accordingly. 20 The uncertainty measures for the two candidates (discussed above) across the
five panel waves are the basis for the rest of the analysis in this section. 
A simple test is to examine the aggregate levels of uncertainty across the five panel waves. 
Thus , I calculated the uncertainty means for each candidate in each survey wave. These 
means are given graphically in Figure 8. There, the mean uncertainty level in a particular 
survey wave are given by the y-axis ,  and the consecutive survey waves are given along the 
x-axis .  21 The filled bar indicates the mean uncertainty level for Ford , and the unfilled bar
the mean uncertainty for Carter, in the particular survey wave. 
Figure 8 affirms that aggregate uncertainty levels did drop substantially between February 
and October. The mean level of voter uncertainty about Ford 's positions dropped from 5 .69 
in February to 4 .40 in October , a change of 1 . 3 points .  Most of this drop occurred between the 
second and third waves of the panel survey: between the April and June interview periods. 
Mean uncertainty about Carter's positions dropped virtually the same amount , as shown in 
20In the 1976 panel data,  nine seven-point scales ae available in the fifth and last wave of the survey. These 
covered government provision of employment , involvement in the internal affairs of other nations , wage and 
price controls,  defense spending,  social welfare spending , tax cuts, legalized abortion , crime, and busing.  
For the fifth wave, then , the uncertainty variables is constructed by subtracting the respondent 's placement 
of the candidate on the issue from the candidate's positin,  where the latter was measured by the mean 
position across all-respondents placing-th�andidatec on·the�ssue: ·.£,espondents-not-placing the candidate
were assumed to be maximally uncertain about the candidate's position . Unfortunately, three issu_e scales 
used to calculate the fifth wave uncertainty measures were not available in the first two survey waves and are 
not included in the calculation of the uncertainty measure for these two waves (foreign involvement , crime, 
and wage and price control scales . )  I must point out that Patterson carried out extensive tests to determine 
if any changes in respondent reported perceptions were induced by the repeated surveying of their opinions ; 
Patterson found no such artifacts in this data.  
2 1 The five survey waves were February, April , June, August , and October . 
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the figure. Most of the reduction in Carter policy uncertainty, though, occurred between 
August (fourth wave) and October (fifth wave ) ,  j ust after the massive flow of substantive 
and issue-specific information about Jimmy Carter. Interestingly, however, these reductions 
in Carter uncertainty are probably heavily understated. While most respondents in the first 
wave of the panel study recognized Ford and were able to place him on most of the policy 
scales , only 20% of these same respondents recognized Carter or were able to place him on 
the seven-point policy scales . 22 And those who could recognize Carter and place him on the
scales in February were better educated, more informed about politics , and more exposed 
to political information - and hence they were probably much more certain of Carter's 
positions on the issues. This no doubt explains the "increase" in Carter mean uncertainty 
which is seen between the first two survey waves . 
Thus, these observed reductions in voter uncertainty about the policy positions of both 
candidates in 1976 across the campaign , are evidence that voter learning occurred during the 
campaign. This supports the hypothesis taken from the Bayesian learning model, that as 
more information about the positions of the candidates is made available to the electorate, 
that reductions in uncertainty should occur. 
But what of the patterns at the individual-level? Of course, i t  i s  possible that these the 
reductions in voter uncertainty at the aggregate level are masking more dramatic changes in 
the uncertainty voters had of the two candidates in the 1 976 election. So I now turn to an 
analysis of the changes in the individual-level survey data. 
My measure of individual- level changes in uncertainty about the presidential candidates 
is simply the difference between the voter's uncertainty about the policy stands of each 
candidate at two different points in time. I examined the changes in uncertainty between 
the second and third (April and June) , and the fourth and fifth (August and October) survey 
waves.  These two different time periods were chosen deliberately since the change in voter 
uncertainty between April and June occurred late in the primary season, while the change 
between the August and October waves fell during the general election contest . Examining 
the changes in uncertainty between the primary and general election contexts should provide 
insight into the possible effects each of these electoral institutions on voter awareness of the 
policy posi tions of the candidates . 
However, rather than study the simple differences between each voter 's uncertainty for the 
candidates at two points in time, I analyzed only the reductions in voter uncertainty which 
were substantial .  To determine substantial changes in voter uncertainty, I calculated the 
two uncertainty differences and their standard errors . Changes between the two uncertainty 
measures at the_individual-Jev:eLwere...deemed substa.ntiaLif .. they .... wer.e.g�eater-0r less than one 
standard deviation from zero . That is ,  positive changes greater than one standard deviation 
from zero were termed substantial increases in uncertainty, while negative changes 
22There were 898 respondents for whom it  was possible to calculate the uncertainty measure for Ford in 
the February panel . But only 1 84 respondents are included in the identical calculation for Carter in the first
panel wave . 
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greater than one standard deviation from zero were called substantial reductions in voter 
uncertainty. 
In Table 2 are given the percentages between the April and June, and the August and 
October, uncertainty measures. The first observation to make about the percentages in 
Table 2 is  that most changes in uncertainty were within a standard deviation of zero. Since
the standard deviations of the differences in candidate uncertainty presented here all were 
approximately 3, that means that most of the observed changes in voter uncertainty between 
these survey waves were plus or minus 3 points from zero. This is clearly a conservative 
measure of changes in uncertainty. 
Secondly, note that in the primary period, approximately 20% of respondents had sub­
stantial reductions in their uncertainty of both candidates . The percentages with substantial 
reductions in their uncertainty increased by one percent for Carter, but fell by almost 7% 
for Ford. Thus , around one-fifth of the respondents according to this measure of changes in 
uncertainty became more certain of the positions of the candidates in either survey period. 
Third·, note that the percentages of respondents who were deemed to have had substantial 
increases in their uncertainty of the candidates during this election were generally small .  The 
percent of respondents who appear to have become more uncertain of the positions of Ford 
and Carter is never much over 7% of the sample . 
Again,  the results reported in Table 2 provide support for the hypothesis that learning 
occured during the 1 976 campaign . Approximately one-fifth of the respondents in either the 
primary period or the general election period became substantially more certain of the posi­
t ions of Ford and Carter. Given that my approach to categorizing respondents as becoming 
more certain of the positions of the candidates is quite conservative, this is an important 
finding. 
Yet the question remains - which respondents appear to have learned about the positions 
of the candidates in either the primary or general election period? Do voters with high 
information costs ,  or low exposure to poli tical information , learn about the campaign? Or 
is learning confined to only voters with greater access to information , and lower costs of 
processing that information? 
To answer these questions , I examined the mean education , political information, and 
media exposure, levels for those respondents who had a substantial reduction in uncertainty 
in the primary and general election periods relative to the means of the same three variables 
for those who had no substantial changes in uncertainty. 23 To ascertain the magnitude
23These three independent variables were operationalized from the 1 976 survey data.  Education was coded 
1 for those with a grade-school education or less , 2 for those with a high school education , 3 for those with 
some college or vocational training , and 4 for those with college degrees . Political information is a ten-point 
scale where the respondent was given a p oint for each time both p arties were placed on an issue scale and the 
Democratic party was p laced as a more liberal party than the Republicans. Media exposure was constructed 
as a factor scale from variables measuring the regularity with which the respondent was exposed to news 
coverage in newspapers , news magazines ,  television news , and conversations with others . The principal 
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of the differences , I calculated the differences between each set of means and a p=0 .05 
confidence interval that the observed difference between the means implies a significant 
difference between population means . 24 
The results of this analysis are given in Tables 3 (differences in education) ,  4 (differences 
in political information) , and 5 (differences in media exposure) . Each table gives the mean 
level of the particular variable for the respondents who became substantially less uncertain 
about the candidate across the survey periods, the mean level for those with no substantial 
change in uncertainty, the difference in the two means , and the last two columns give the 
lower and upper bounds for the 95% confidence interval . The tables are arranged so that a 
positive difference between the means would indicate that those with substantial reductions 
in candidate policy position uncertainty would be better educated, politically informed, and 
media exposed than those with no substantial change in uncertainty; additionally, a negative 
difference indicates that those respondents with substantial reductions in uncertainty are less 
educated, informed, and exposed to the mass media. 
Notice first that in each table, the differences between the means are always negative. 
Thus , respondents in the 1 976 survey who became less uncertain of the positions of the 
candidates between the April and June survey waves , or the August and October waves, 
were less educated , less polit ically informed , and less exposed to the media than those who 
had no substantial change in their uncertainty. Secondly, most of these differences in means 
are statistically significant , meaning that for the differences in means that are starred , the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in the population between the mean values of these three 
variables can be rejected with confidence. The only exception to this second observation are 
the differences in means for changes in Carter uncertainty between the April and June survey 
waves , and the differences in mean media exposure levels for Ford uncertainty reductions in 
the primary period. 
These results are very interesting. As demonstrated elsewhere (Alvarez 1 992) , respon­
dents who are better educated, informed , and exposed to the mass media coverage of the 
campaign are more certain of the candidates ' posit ions at the end of the general election .  
The implication of these results is that in  general these same voters do  not become more 
certain of the positions of the candidates during the campaign, either in the primary or 
general election period. Thus, the voters who do reduce their uncertainty of the positions of 
the candidates , those voters who learn from the campaign , are less educated , informed, and 
exposed to the media coverage of the campaign. 
components factor analysis of these items yielded on factor,  eigenvalue 8.37. For additional discussions of 
these variables and the Patterson data, see Alvarez ( 1 992) . 
24The simple -t=test 'for o-differ€rn:es ebetween -means -was implemented in"'SAS ,  using the G LM procedure.
This test is subject to Type I error , in which one falsely rej ects a null hypothesis ,  since the probability of 
i ncorrectly rej ecting a null of no difference in population means increases as the number of t-test increases. 
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4 C onclusion 
In the last section I provided evidence that during the 1976 campaign voters did learn about
the policy positions of both candidates . First , I argued that even during this campaign the 
preconditions existed for voter learning to occur, since as the campaign progressed, the infor­
mation flow increasingly concentrated on Carter and Ford ,  and on the substantive aspects of 
their candidacies - including their policy positions. Then, I showed with both aggregate and 
individual-level evidence that reductions in voter uncertainty occurred across the campaign, 
which I asserted to be confirmation of the prediction from the Bayesian learning model . 
Lastly, I demonstrated that these reductions in voter uncertainty did not occur randomly 
across voters , but rather were concentrated among the less educated ,  informed, and exposed 
to the mass media. These results confirm the prediction of the Bayesian learning model . 
New information made available by the campaign is incorporated into voter perceptions of 
the candidates , especially in their uncertainty of candidate policy positions . 
This implies that presidential campaigns are important sources of information for voters . 
Addit ionally, campaigns provide information for those voters who start out less informed 
about the positions of the candidates , and gives these voters the vehicle with which to 
become more certain of where the candidates stand on the issues . And by becoming more 
certain of the positions of the candidates , these same voters become better able by the end 
of the general election to make their decision on the basis of policy issues . 
Unfortunately, demonstrating that substantial changes in voter uncertainty lead to changes 
in preferences is not possible with the 1 976 survey data. The learning model predicted that 
voters became dramat ically more certain of a candidate's policy positions would also become 
more likely to prefer that candidate. There simply are too few respondents in the survey 
sample who had substantial reductions in their uncertainty, and who changed their candidate 
preferences in the general election, to test this hypothesis .  Yet given that the voters who 
appear to learn the most during the campaign are also ' the most likely to have malleable 
preferences , it is quite likely that their preferences do change in response to the information 
they obtain from the campaign (Converse 1 964 ; Zaller 1 989) . 
Yet this analysis does show that voters do learn from presidential election campaigns .  The 
lesson of the Bayesian learning model , and of the empirical work in this paper, is that we 
must keep in mind that there are many different types of information made available during 
a campaign ,  and that voters might incorporate this information into their prior beliefs in 
different ways . The manifestations of learning, then , can be found not only in changes in 
voter preferences , but in changes in their perceptions or misperceptions of the candidates as 
well . 
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Table 1 :  Campaign Events ,  1 976 
Iowa Caucuses 
New Hampshire Primary 
Arkansas Primary (last) 
Democratic Convention 
Republican Convention 
Domestic Policy Debate 
Foreign Policy Debate 
Third Debate 
Election Day 
25 
January 1 9  
February 25 
June  26 
July 1 2-1 7 
August 1 7-20 
September 23 
October 6 
October 22 
November 2 
---
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Table 2 :  Changes in Voter Uncertainty, 1 976 
Change in Voter Uncertainty: 
Candidate Substantial No Substantial 
Periods Reduction Change Increase 
Carter 
April-June 22 .4 70 .0  7 .6  
Aug. -Oct . 23 .4  72 .8  3 . 8  
Ford 
April-June 22 .0 7 1 . 2  6 . 8  
Aug. -Oct .  1 5 . 7  77 . l 7 .2  
Entries in the three nght columns are the percentages of  respondents 
for whom the difference in their uncertainty for the each candidate was 
more than a standard deviation less than zero (substantial reduction) , 
within a standard deviation of zero (no change) , or a standard deviat ion 
greater than zero (substantial increase) . 
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Table 3 :  Education and Changes in Voter Uncertainty, 1 976 
Education Differences in Sample : 
Education Education 
Mean Mean 
Candidate Substantial No Difference Lower Upper 
Periods Reduction Change In Means Bound Bound 
Carter 
April-June 5 .06 5 . 1 3  -0 .07  -0 .42 0 . 28 
Aug . - O ct .  4 . 74 5 . 14 -0 .41  * - 0 . 74 -0 .08 
Ford 
April-June 4 .56  5 . 1 0  -0 . 54* -0 .86 -0 . 22 
A u g . - Oct . 4 . 33 5 . 08 -0 .  75* - 1 . 1 1  -0 . 39  
Entries give the education means and differences m these means , for 
respondents who substantially reduced their uncertainty of the parti c­
u lar candidate versus those who had no substantial change. across t he 
two survey waves . The two right columns give the 95% confidence in­
terval bounds .  * denotes that the difference in means is statistically 
s ignifi cant at the p = 0 . 05 level . 
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Table 4 :  Polit ical Information and Changes in Voter Uncertainty, 1 976 
Information Differences in S ample: 
Information Information 
Mean Mean 
Candidate Substantial No Difference Lower Upper 
Periods Reduction Change In Means Bound Bound 
Carter 
April-June 5 . 33 5 . 60 -0 .27 - 1 . 1 1  0 . 56 
Aug . - O ct .  5 .00 6 . 72 - 1 .  72* -2 . 42 - 1 . 02  
Ford 
April-June 4 . 39 5 . 1 8 - 0 . 79* - 1 . 5 3  -0 . 04 
Aug . - O ct .  4 . 25 6 . 3 7  - 2 . 1 1  * - 2 . 88 - 1 . 34 
Entries give the political mformation means and differences m t hese 
means , for respondents who substanti ally reduced t heir uncertainty of 
the parti cular candidate versus those who had no substantial change 
across the two survey waves . The two right columns give the 95% 
confidence interval bounds . * denotes that the difference in means i s  
statist i cally significant a t  t h e  p = 0 . 05 level . 
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Table 5 :  Media Exposure and Changes in Voter Uncertainty, 1 976 
Media Exposure Differences in Sample: 
Exposure Exposure 
Mean Mean 
Candidate Substantial No Difference Lower Upper 
Periods Reduction Change In Means Bound Bound 
Carter 
April-June 8 .90 9 . 04 :..0 . 1 4  -0 . 85 0 . 55 
Aug . - O ct .  9 . 34 1 0 . 1  -0 . 7 1  * - 1 . 1 8 - 0 . 25 
Ford 
April-June 8 . 75 8 . 75 -0 . 00 -0 .63 0 . 62 
Aug . - O c t .  9 . 02 9 . 90 -0 .87* - 1 .39 -0 . 39 
. .  Entnes give the politi cal exposure means and differences m these means ,  
for respondents who substantially reduced their uncertainty of the par­
t icular candi date versus those who had no substantial change across 
the two survey waves . The two right columns give the 95% confidence 
interval bounds . * denotes that the difference in means is statistically 
s i gnificant at the p = 0 . 05 level . 
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Figure 1 :  Voter Learning: New Information About a Candidate 's  Position 
Posterior Mean and New Information 
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Note:  Each panel shows the effect of new information about the can­
didate ' s  position , across t he range of precisions of the new inform ation 
( given on the x-axi s ) . The three levels of a voter's prior precl.sions of 
a candidate ' s  position ( low ,  moderate ,  high ) ,  are given by each line . 
The top p anel gives the effects of the new information on the voter 's  
p osterior mean, the bottom on the posterior precision . 
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Figure 2 :  New Information and Changes in  Voter Preferences 
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Note : Each panel shows the effect of new information about the can­
didate 's  position , across t he range of preci sions of the new information 
(given on the .x-axis ) .  The dark Jine i n  each .panel depicts .Rew iRforma-­
tion whi ch indicates that the candidate  not much closer to the voter ; 
the dotted line i nformation that the candidate is much closer to  the 
voter . The top panel shows a simulation where the voter ' s  prior was 
imprecise , and the bottom panel where the voter ' s  prior was precise.  
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Figure 3 :  Hoopla and Substance ,  1 976 
Media Information During the 1 976 Campaign 
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Figure 4 :  References to Carter and Ford 
Candidate Information During the 1976 Campaign 
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Note:  D at a  from 1 976 Patterson media content analysis . Percentages
are of all candidate-specific mentions .  
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Figure 5 :  Hoopla Coverage, 1976 
Hoopla Coverage of the Major Candidates in the 1 976 Campaign 
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Figure 6 :  Substance Coverage, 1976 
Substance Coverage of the Maj or Candidates in the 1 976 Campaign 
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Figure 7 :  Issue Coverage, 1976 
Issue Coverage of the M ajor Candidates in the 1 976 Campaign 
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Note:  D at a  from 1976 Patterson media content analysis . Percentages 
are of all candidate-specific mentions . 
Figure 8 :  Mean Uncertainty Levels Across the 1976 Elections 
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Note : M ean un certainty levels calculated from the 1976 panel study. 
The survey waves on t he x-axis are bi - monthly from February to O c­
tober , 1 9 76 
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